Wednesday, September 07, 2011
CBC's The Current on the UN in Haiti
Thursday, September 01, 2011
The U.N. in Haiti: Time to Adapt or Time to Go
Sep 1 , 2011
By Michael Deibert
Truthdig
(Read the original article here)
In the summer of 2009, visiting Haiti for the first time after an absence of three years, I found the country in better shape than at any time since I started visiting there in 1997.
Three years after the inauguration of René Préval as Haiti’s president (after the two-year tenure of an unelected interim government), the population of Haiti’s capital, Port-au-Prince, again felt safe enough to patronize downtown bars and kerosene-lit roadside stands late into the evening, where once armed gangs controlled entire neighborhoods. Billboards that once praised the infallibility of a succession of maximum leaders instead carried messages about the importance of respect between the population and the police, or decrying discrimination against the disabled.
A police-reform program was in its third year, providing the country with a level of professional law enforcement not often seen in a place where political patronage, not expertise, swelled the ranks of security forces with party loyalists. Investment was beginning to pick up and, by the end of the year, Haiti’s delicious signature rum, Barbancourt, had even won the bronze and silver medals at the International Wine and Spirit Competition.
Presiding over all this was the (at the time) 9,000-member United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti, known as MINUSTAH. When I sat that summer in the office of the head of the mission, veteran Tunisian diplomat Hédi Annabi, he seemed to be justified in his pride at the country’s progress, telling me that “the level of respect for basic freedoms, such as freedom of the press, is at a historically remarkable level.”
Of course, all of this changed at 4:53 p.m. on Jan. 12, 2010, when the country was struck by an apocalyptic earthquake that leveled much of the capital and surrounding towns and killed an estimated 200,000 people. Annabi, his deputy and nearly 100 other MINUSTAH personnel died as the structures they were in collapsed on them, and the peacekeeping mission itself became one of the many strata of Haitian society that needed rescuing.
A year and a half after the quake, with a new president (popular singer Michel “Sweet Micky” Martelly) and a contentious parliament locked in a bitter struggle for power, MINUSTAH, having picked itself up and dusted itself off, remains in Haiti, its force now increased to 12,000 under the leadership of Chile’s former minister of foreign affairs, Mariano Fernández.
Though an estimated 634,000 survivors of the quake still live in makeshift settlements in and around the capital, and Haiti remains without a government (two of Martelly’s nominees for prime minister have been rejected), it is my conclusion after a visit to Haiti last month that it is now time, after seven years in the country, for MINUSTAH to either significantly refocus its mission or close its operation in Haiti and leave the business of governing and reconstruction to the Haitians themselves.
Haitians have a keen sense of their own history as the site of the world’s first successful slave revolt (in 1804) and the second independent republic in the Americas (after the United States), a nation that has produced guerrilla leaders of the magnitude of Charlemagne Péralte and Benoît Batravill when faced with a two-decade U.S. occupation of the country in the early 20th century.
If you ask the average Haitian on the street what the purpose of MINUSTAH in Haiti is now, as I did in a vast tent encampment of displaced earthquake survivors in front of Haiti’s still-collapsed National Palace, they will answer you succinctly: MINUSTAH is in Haiti to protect the interests of the foreigners.
True or not, such a perspective has become conventional wisdom in Haiti, and it was a refrain that I heard time and again as I traveled this country that, though still stricken, is by no means beaten or defeated.
At this point, for the first time since I have been observing the mission, the sentiment on the street among a majority of Haitians appears to be a desire to see MINUSTAH in its current incarnation gone from Haiti.
For several reasons, MINUSTAH’s reputation with the Haitian people has reached its lowest level since it arrived in 2004.
A cholera epidemic that has killed more than 5,800 people since October has been linked convincingly to the mission. A June report by a group of epidemiologists and physicians in the journal of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said that evidence “strongly suggests” that the cholera strain had been brought to Haiti by U.N. peacekeepers and spread through a faulty waste disposal system along the Artibonite River, a conclusion supported by other studies.
Rightly or wrongly, the perception of MINUSTAH’s response to the crisis within Haiti itself has been of the mission stonewalling and obfuscating. This perception was reinforced in August when some residents of the country’s Plateau Central region accused the mission of dumping raw sewage near the Guayamouc River there, something MINUSTAH has denied.
In a far cry from the largely congenial relations I saw between U.N. peacekeepers and the local population in 2009, something of a bunker mentality has also appeared to have developed. On several instances—particularly at the intersection of the busy Route de Delmas and the road that eventually leads to the country’s international airport—I witnessed peacekeepers patrolling with their mounted machine guns pointed down at crowds of people who appeared to pose no threat at all and were merely going about the business of trying to secure the basic necessities of survival on any given day.
Staying in a hotel only feet away from a tent encampment where thousands of Haitians sat in darkness throughout long evenings of pounding rain, an American filmmaker and I watched as a group of rather surly, well-fed men identifying themselves as police advisers with MINUSTAH literally drank themselves into oblivion over the course of two days. This took place under the gaze of local Haitian staff and other guests. Speaking to others in the capital, I discovered that such behavior is evidently not an uncommon occurrence, and it creates the unfortunate perception of a fraternity party amid an apocalypse, and makes the mission appear very removed from the daily struggles of the Haitians it is ostensibly there to protect.
By any estimation, MINUSTAH has done many things for Haiti during its years in the country. During a 2004-06 campaign of violence in the capital by various armed groups dubbed Operation Baghdad, a ghastly wave of kidnapping, arson and murder affected all levels of society, and at one point an average of one police officer was being killed every five days. The security forces of the interim government then in power often responded to this by broadly targeting the impoverished male population of the capital’s slums with extrajudicial executions. In tandem with Haiti’s police after Préval’s 2006 inauguration, MINUSTAH largely brought this period to an end, something for which Haitians should be grateful to it.
Likewise, when elements linked to political actors used the population’s legitimate anger over the rise of food prices as a cover for violent attacks against government installations and figures in 2008, it was likely only the presence of MINUSTAH that saved Préval from being toppled by a coup organized by these same elements.
MINUSTAH has built roads and worked hard to create a space where nonviolent political debate can take place. Haiti, however, ultimately needs to be governed and administered by Haitians, not as some eternal international protectorate. Having stood with Haitians through some of their worst days, the United Nations is now being seen more and more as an occupying force despite the fact that it has been in Haiti at the invitation of two democratically elected heads of state for five of its seven years there.
If Haiti is ever to change, it is Haitians who are going to have to change it, and MINUSTAH must now give them the space in which to do so. Haiti’s security force—the Police Nationale d’Haiti—has grown by leaps and bounds in terms of professionalism and accountability under the leadership of Mario Andresol, and now must be entrusted with more responsibility in terms of safeguarding the country’s fragile democratic gains.
Simultaneously, with so much hostility building up toward the mission in the country’s agricultural areas and elsewhere due to the cholera epidemic, the mission might do well to engage with Haitian peasant organizations in an effort to help revitalize the country’s ailing rural economy. Though peasant groups such as Tèt Kole Ti Peyizan and the 200,000-member Mouvman Peyizan Nasyonal Kongre Papay (the latter led by veteran peasant leader Chavannes Jean-Baptiste, winner of the 2005 Goldman Environmental Prize for grassroots environmentalists) have been largely hostile to MINUSTAH’s presence, a détente between the groups could help foster the transition from strict peacekeeping to development, which is needed if the mission is to succeed.
Neither the United Nations, the United States nor any other foreign body can fix all of Haiti’s ills. Ultimately, the Haitians have to do it for themselves. Among Haiti’s political class, Haitians have to stop killing one another, Haitians have to stop being corrupt, Haitians have to stop paying and accepting bribes, and politics must no longer be viewed as a blood sport of winner take all where one side celebrates total victory and one side weeps in abject defeat and marginalization.
This has been the tradition of Haitian politics for more than 200 years, but it has not been the tradition of the majority of Haitians who have historically been excluded from the political process, and whose generosity, industry and fundamental decency impress all those who meet them.
The Haitian people understand this better than anyone else. In its current incarnation in Haiti, the United Nations mission has become an obstacle, rather than an asset, to the country taking ownership of the issues that confront it.
It is time for the mission to refocus on new tasks, or to leave while the Haitians can still see it off as a friend.
Sunday, September 20, 2009
Report of the United Nations fact finding mission on the Gaza conflict
Monday, June 15, 2009
Measuring the Drowned and the Saved in Sudan
A Review of Mahmood Mamdani’s Saviors and Survivors : Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror
15 June 2009
By Michael Deibert
(Please read the original article here)
The conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan, along with the ongoing conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia, represents one of the most vexing challenges on the African continent confronting the international community today.
A dispute which the United Nations estimates has killed at over 200,000 people and displaced at least 2 million since 2003 [1], the conflict in Darfur has seen Sudanese military and government-aligned militia forces (the latter collectively know as janjaweed) squaring off against an array of rebel groups who in recent years have splintered into an ever-shifting tapestry of alliances.
Mahmood Mamdani, a professor of government and anthropology at New York’s Columbia University, is the latest in the line of academics to try and make sense of Sudan’s tangled history with Saviors and Survivors : Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror (Pantheon Books), a book whose bile unfortunately overwhelms its reason.
Mamdami theorizes that the international movement calling for international intervention to halt the violence in Darfur is essentially a deliberate extension of the Bush-era “War on Terror” doctrine of preemptive military action, a doctrine which led to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. While this a thesis certainly worth exploring, the chief problem with Mamdani’s book is that the author reveals a vision so stilted and distorted by the Iraq debacle that he seems to only be able to view all of world history - including that of Sudan - through its lens.
When Mamdani unfavorably compares the mobilization against the Iraq war as tepid in comparison to the mobilization against the Sudanese government’s actions in Darfur, one wonders if he is unaware of the massive demonstrations that took place in early 2003 demanding that no military action be launched in Iraq. A demonstration that took place in New York in February of that year numbered around 100,000 protesters, numbers that those seeking to halt the violence in Darfur could never dream of approaching in sheer scale.
But advocacy itself is a problem, Mamdani argues, pouring particular scorn on the Save Darfur Coalition, a U.S. based grouping of nearly 200 religious, political, and human rights organizations of varying political stripes.
Sneeringly dismissing the group as a collection of “the Christian Right and Secular Zionist groups,” “the humanitarian intervention lobby” and “African American and Christian groups,” Mamdani assails, without apparent irony, the tendency of Save Darfur to “rely on the evidence of their eyes and avoid any discussion of context.”
Mamdani recounts Save Darfur’s organizational structure - boringly normal to anyone familiar with the workings of non-governmental organizations - as if revealing a smoking-gun about the illuminati at the Darfur debate’s core. Though grudgingly granting that the movement “initially had the salutary effect of directing world attention” to the horrendous violence in Darfur. it now “must now bear some of the blame for delaying reconciliation,” a seeming wild overstatement of the group’s lobbying power.
Leaving aside the fact the Save Darfur is part of a global, not national, solidarity movement with the victims of Darfur’s violence (a movement which includes organizations such as Urgence Darfour in France), some of Mamdani’s more damming claims would appear not to stand up upon further inspection. His assessment that Save Darfur’s minutely-detailed maps of the tide of ethnic cleansing in the region are “a full blown pornography of violence...almost none of it telling you when it happened,” is simply false. Satellite evidence on the group’s website is marked with both the month and the year of attacks and the destruction of buildings therein [2].
Perhaps the book’s most troubling aspect, one that is of a piece with some of Mamdani’s more outlandish claims about the Save Darfur coalition, is a worrisome pattern of simplification and omission when digging into the actual mechanics of how the Darfur counter-insurgency was conceived and conducted.
The murderous handiwork of janjaweed leader Musa Hilal is relegated to two sentences in the book’s 398 pages. By contrast, in their 2005 assessment Darfur : A Short History of a Long War, veteran Sudan observers Julie Flint and Alex de Waal wrote of Hilal that “Arab supremacy has converged with criminal impunity, and the result has been cataclysm.” As much as any one individual, Musa Hilal has helped bring Darfur to its current wretched state, but you wouldn’t know it from reading Mamdani’s book.
Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, who seized power in a 1989 coup launched with the support of the National Islamic Front of al-Bashir’s then-ally Hassan al-Turabi, is likewise strangely absent from Mamdani’s analysis, except for Mamdani’s claim that none of the charges laid against al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) “can bear historical scrutiny.”
The ICC charges, which call for al-Bashir’s arrest on five counts of crimes against humanity and two counts of war crimes [3] are, despite Mamdani’s claims, not a departure from the ICC’s usual mandate, but rather quite similar in their language to charges laid out against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo, two of the militia leaders in the Ituri conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the early part of this decade [4]. Despite this, Mamdani declares that the Sudanese president’s guilt or innocence is less important to Africa than “the relationship between law and politics,” as if the continent is a suitable canvas over which academics to theorize, but not where lawyers and judges can enforce the rule of law
Chronicling the splintering within the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) rebel movements in 2005 - which made the situation even more perilous for Darfur’s long-suffering civilians - Mamdani focuses heavily of the freelance banditry of various rebel factions, with far less attention is paid to the activity of government-aligned militias. Such outrages as the slaughter of over 100 civilians by Sudanese government forces in Darfur in February 2008 [5] go unrecorded, with Mamdani stating flatly at one point that the “Janjawid was not an ideological forces nor the fighting arm of an ideologically driven movement.”
This is simply untrue. Documents obtained from the Sudanese government in 2004 by Human Rights Watch - an organization whose work in Sudan Mamdani almost entirely ignores - demonstrate conclusively to any reasonable obersevor the involvement of the Sudanese state in the recruiting and arming of janjaweed to carry out violence on an ethnic basis [6] . Mamdani’s silence on this score is inexplicable.
As the book progresses, Mamdani’s hyper-focus on actual imperialist history and presumed imperialist intent leads to a schizophrenia in the book that never fully resolves itself.
Often strongly and accurately critical of the actions of the United States in Africa, Mamdani nevertheless quotes, as his base source for the numbers of dead in the conflict, the Government Accountability Office, an arm of the U.S. congress. Mamdani’s seeming relegation of those who did not die directly from violence from his tally of the dead in Darfur, as if war-related starvation and disease leave the human body any less dead than a bullet, is one of the book’s more distasteful arguments.
Similarly, though, according to Mamdani, the United Nations is to be distrusted as a useful tool of neocolonialist designs, reports from UN organizations such as the United Nations Environment Programme are frequently referred to by the author for the apparently lucid analysis which they bring. Mamdani’s colonialism-under-every-rock approach is such that at one point he claims that brutal counterinsurgency methods originated with “colonial era settler wars against Amerindians,” which must come as news to anyone who has ever read Tacitus’ 2,000-year old account of the Roman conquest of Britain, or Thucydides’ even older History of the Peloponnesian War.
Mamdani also has an unfortunate tendency to make sweeping statements which he is unable to back up with evidence in his text. While he writes that the January 2005 report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations found the government of Sudan not guilty of pursuing a policy of genocide, the actual wording of the report is a bit more muddled, reading in part as follows [7] :
The crucial element of genocidal intent appears to be missing, at least as far as the central Government authorities are concerned...the Commission does recognize that in some instances individuals, including Government officials, may commit acts with genocidal intent.
Stating as unchallenged fact that one of the main rebel groups, the JEM, was “developed” by Hassan al-Turabi (a charge that both al-Turabi and the JEM have denied) is an assertion that Mamdani never proves, despite repeating it several times throughout the book. The same goes for Mamdani’s contention that former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell made his famous September 2004 declaration that genocide was taking place in Darfur “under pressure.”
Mamdani’s tone when writing about the Sudanese themselves can often be jarring in its arrogance. Non-combatant Sudanese who call for an international military mission in Darfur are guilty of a “meager knowledge of developments” in their own country, while those issuing the same calls from within Darfur itself suffer from “naiveté.”
Despite the book’s flaws, through its middle half, Mamdani is relatively sober, and surveys the dramatic litany of coups, counter-coups and violent political skirmishes following Sudan’s 1956 independence from Britain in thorough if rather wooden fashion. Accurately pointing the finger at the governments of Ronald Reagan and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi for their roles in stoking regional conflicts throughout the 1980s, Mamdani neglects to explore in any depth the latter’s history of regional destabilization through support for brutal rebel armies such as Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia and Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front.
Towards the end of Saviors and Survivors, Mamdani charges that “the Save Darfur lobby in the United States has turned the tragedy of the people of Darfur into a knife with which to slice Africa.” Going several steps further from this vituperative attack, he charges that the push to hold the authors of Darfur’s agony accountable for their actions is in fact “really a slogan that masks a big power agenda to recolonize Africa.”
Such strident statements do precious little to illuminate the actual dynamic - the context, as Mr. Mamdani would say - of the suffering of the disenfranchised, left at such loose ends and defenseless in the villages and refugee camps of Darfur and eastern Chad.
Despite its dismissive attitude towards the actual victims of violence in Sudan and their concerns, upon finishing Saviors and Survivors it is their voices - voice one searches for in vain in the book itself - that the reader most wishes to at long last hear.
…………………….
Michael Deibert is a Senior Fellow at New York’s World Policy Institute who reports frequently on Africa. He is the author of Note from the Last Testament : The Struggle for Haiti (Seven Stories Press).
Notes
[1] United Nations and Darfur Fact Sheet, published by the Peace and Security Section of the United Nations Department of Public Information, August 2007. [2] Eyes on Darfur, Amnesty International project funded by the Save Darfur Coalition. http://www.eyesondarfur.org/ [3] 3. Case The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, International Criminal Court. http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/ [4] Case The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, International Criminal Court. http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/ [5] “They Shot at Us as We Fled : Government Attacks on Civilians in West Darfur,” Human Rights Watch, May 2008. http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/ [6] "Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support," Human Rights Watch, 20 July 2004. http://www.hrw.org/legacy/ [7] Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General 25 January 2005. www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
A Plea from Local Organizations and Civil Society in North Kivu, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
A Plea from Local Organizations and Civil Society in North Kivu, Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, to the United Nations Security Council and Other International Leaders
Goma, November 18, 2008
Dear Excellencies,
As the representatives of Congolese non-governmental organizations in North Kivu, we come before your authority to request an immediate reinforcement of peacekeeping forces for the Democratic Republic of Congo, reinforcements that would be capable of protecting us. This would help to prevent the atrocities that continue to be committed against civilians on an ever greater scale here in North Kivu, on the border of Rwanda and Uganda.
This letter presents a sad, cynical, tragic and very frustrating situation, which reveals the misery in which the population of North Kivu are immersed. We are anxious, afraid and utterly traumatised by the constant insecurity in which we live. We don’t know which saint to pray to; we are condemned to death by all this violence and displacement. We have been abandoned. Who will protect us? Who will help us? The United Nations says that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, but our dignity and our rights are violated every day with hardly a cry of protest. Do we not deserve protection? Are we not equal to others?
Since August 28, fighting has intensified in many areas, causing deaths, rapes, lootings, forced recruitment and further displacements of civilian populations. The population has thus been immersed in unspeakable suffering. In the last few days, fighting has drawn closer to large populated areas, such as the town of Goma. Fighting has also invaded and torn apart the region of Rutshuru, particularly in the town of Kiwanja, where hundreds of civilian deaths have now been recorded.
The suffering has gone on too long for the population of North Kivu. It is time for the government and the international community to protect the civilians who have fallen victim to the atrocities of the conflict.
We are aware that during several high-level visits to eastern Congo this year, you and your representatives heard many firsthand testimonies which could not have left you indifferent to the tragedy facing the population of our region of the DRC.
The various diplomatic and political meetings held over the last few weeks have demonstrated your commitment to finding an immediate and sustainable solution that would establish peace in North Kivu and thus bring stability to the Great Lakes region. Among the most remarkable developments, we note Rwanda’s direct involvement in the search for a sustainable solution to the crisis.
While we wish to thank you for these supportive visits and for your concerns about the tragedy here in eastern Congo, we also urge you to move from theory to practice, by transforming your kind speeches and messages into action. Diplomacy always takes time, and we understand this, but unfortunately we do not have time. The population of North Kivu is at risk now; with each day that passes, more and more people die.
For more than three decades, eastern Congo has been at war, and those who suffer most are civilians, especially women and children. There have been many attempts to resolve the crisis in the east, but none have succeeded. The most recent initiative to date was the Goma Peace Agreement (the Act of Engagement], signed by all belligerents in January 2008. But today this is no longer respected. Instead of peace, we are witnessing the continuation and exacerbation of the conflict.
In the past several days, the region of Rutshuru has been in the grip of hostilities. The town of Kiwanja has been taken and re-taken by the CNDP, and the population is paying the price. We are witnessing tragedies on a scale never experienced before in history, in which civilian populations are being summarily executed by bullets or blows from machetes, knives, hoes and spears. Corpses line the streets of the city and the odour of decomposing bodies greets passers-by. Indeed, the number of corpses already found is not conclusive, as searches continue, and, according to the latest reports, even more dead bodies are locked inside houses or thrown down latrines.
As the conquering army of Laurent Nkunda gradually takes new areas, the Congolese army takes flight. As they flee, they end up killing, pillaging, raping and stealing, leaving chaos and total disorder in their wake. This is the case in Goma, where more than 20 civilians were killed, several women were raped, and valuable goods were stolen on October 29. Since last week, the towns of Kanyabayonga, Kirumba and Kayna have been invaded in almost the same way as Goma by FARDC soldiers fleeing the fighting.
Forced recruitment has also intensified. In several areas of Rutshuru and Masisi, armed groups, the CNDP in particular, go from door to door to force young boys and adults – aged between 14 and 40 – to go to the front, without any prior military training. Last week, reports documented the recruitment by force of hundreds of civilians by the CNDP, especially in Kitchanga, Kiwanja, Rutshuru and Rubare.
In all of these cases, we, the civilian population, have been held hostage and caught between many lines of fire.
Women are among the first victims. Sexual violence has become dramatically worse since the end of August, as military forces and armed groups have reduced women to a battlefield.
Faced with a sense of abandonment, the people’s reaction has become one of self-defence. We do not know the limits of this. This has been the case of Mai Mai in Kiwanja and in the Kanyabayonga area.
MONUC has fallen short of fulfilling its mandate to protect civilians, openly and publicly, but no concrete action has been taken. Powerless, MONUC witnesses all the atrocities committed by the armed forces and groups. At times, its interventions are delayed, if not ineffective. We can therefore no longer continue to rely on MONUC to protect us. The case of Kiwanja, where civilians are massacred daily near the MONUC base, is a striking example.
We ask you urgently to assist us at this most difficult time. It is absolutely clear to everyone that we need reinforcements of troops capable of protecting civilians effectively and efficiently, with the means to deal with any kind of attacks. This must be done quickly.
We therefore urge you to:
- Immediately send EU troops which can deploy quickly to provide protection and security for civilians as you did for our brothers and sisters in Bunia, Ituri, in June 2003.
- Increase the number of troops for MONUC and provide them with a mandate that allows them to sufficiently protect civilians and to do so as their top priority.
Your Excellencies, you must save our lives now; otherwise it will be too late.
Yours sincerely,
The representatives of 44 Congolese NGOs in North Kivu:
- Action de Promotion et d'Assistance pour l'Amélioration du Niveau des Vies des Populations (APANIVIP)
- Action Paysanne pour la Reconstruction et le Développement Communautaire Intégral (APREDECI)
- Action pour la Promotion de la Participation Citoyenne – Nord Kivu (APPC/NK)
- Action pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits des Personnes Défavorisées (APRODEPED)
- Action Sociale pour la Paix et le Développement (ASPD)
- Africa Justice Peace and Development (AJPD)
- Blessed Aid
- Bureau d’Information, Formation, Etude et Recherche en Développement (BIFERD)
- CADRE
- Campagne Pour la Paix (CPP)
- Centre d’Observation des Droits de l’Homme et d’Assistance Sociale (CODHAS)
- Centre de Recherche sur l'Environnement, la Démocratie et les Droits de l'Homme (CADERCO)
- Centre de Recherche sur l'Environnement, la Démocratie et les Droits de l'Homme (CREDDHO)
- Centre pour la Paix et les Droits de l’Homme – Peace and Human Rights Center (CPDH-PHRC)
- CEREBA/RDC
- Change Agents Peace Program (CAPP)
- Coalition pour mettre fin a l'utilisation d'enfants soldats en RDC /Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers in DRC
- CODHOP
- Collectif des Associations des Femmes Pour le Développement (CAFED)
- Collectif des ONG de Droits de l'Homme (CODHO)
- Collectif des Organisations des Jeunes Solidaires du Congo (COJESKI)/ Nord Kivu
- Conseil Régional des Organisations Non Gouvernementales de Développement (CRONGD)
- COPADI
- Encadrement des Femmes Indigènes et des Ménages Vulnérables (EFIM)
- GAMAC
- Group d'Etudes et d'Actions Pour un Développement Bien Défini (GEAD)
- Human Dignity in the World (HDW)
- Platform des Femmes du Nord Kivu pour un Développement Endogène (PFNDE)
- Programme de Lutte Contre l’Extrême Pauvreté et la Misère (PAMI)
- Promotion de la Démocratie et Protection des Droits Humains (PDH)
- Promotion et Appui aux Initiatives Féminines (PAIF)
- Réseau Congolais d’Action sur les Armes Légères et le Petit Calibre (RECAAL)
- Réseau d’Organisations des Droits Humains, d’Education Civique et de Paix (RODHECIP)
- Réseau Femme et Développement (REFED)
- Réseau Provincial des ONG de Droits de l'Homme (REPRODHOC)/Nord Kivu
- SAMS
- Société civile Territoire de Rutshuru
- Solidarité pour la Promotion sociale et la Paix (SOPROP)
- SOS/Grands-Lacs
- Syndicat des Associations Féminines pour un Développement Intégral (SAFEDI)
- Synergie des femmes pour les victimes des violences sexuelles (SFVS)
- Synergie des ONG locales pour les Urgences Humanitaires dans le territoire de Rutshuru
- UPADERI
- Villages Cobaye (VICO)