Saturday, December 31, 2022

Haiti Is At War

Aug 14, 2022

Haiti Is At War

By Michael Deibert

Ozy

Haiti has a long, troubled history of politicians using local gangs for political muscle and influence. But what’s happening now is strange and new — the gangs are moving into the power vacuum created by a failing state to exert more autonomy and authority in what’s quickly becoming the biggest crisis in the Americas. 

(Read the original article here)

No safe way out 

The burned-out hulk of the car belonging to the former senator and his driver rested beside a bucolic mountain road that cuts through the hills above Port-au-Prince. The bodies of its former occupants, as charred and desecrated as the vehicle itself, lay inside.

 

For much of the past year, motorists attempting to leave Haiti’s capital for the southern peninsula — an area dotted with undulating hills, shimmering beaches and picturesque colonial towns — would traverse the lanes though Laboule 12 in an attempt to avoid the warring gangs that operated along the other route that led through the sprawling slum of Martissant, a take-your-life-in-your-hands proposition that saw motorists kidnapped or shot dead with terrifying regularity.

 

By the time Yvon Buissereth — a former senator who had been appointed head of the government’s social housing division by former President Jovenel Moïse (himself assassinated in spectacular fashion in July 2021) — opted to try his luck on the road last weekend, Haiti was in the throes of a state collapse the likes of which has rarely been experienced in the Western Hemisphere this century.

 

The gang that allegedly murdered Buissereth is led by a criminal known as Ti Makak (Little Monkey), one of dozens of armed groups currently operating in Port-au-Prince. The gang emerged to fè dezòd (make disorder) in the zone just as the forces of the Police Nationale d’Haïti (PNH), the country’s beleaguered national police force, was launching an offensive against another gang, the 400 Mawozo (400 Hillbillies), who run a kidnapping ring based in the city’s northeastern suburb of Croix-des-Bouquets, but whose territorial control extends all the way to the border with the Dominican Republic. This past spring, a failed attempt by the 400 Mawozo to seize the territory of a rival gang, the Chen Mechan (Mad Dogs), in this area, known as the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac, killed at least 191 people, according to the human rights organization Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH). Thousands more were displaced.


What links these two apparently unrelated episodes of violence on opposite sides of the capital also tells the story of state collapse in Haiti. An implosion that has rapidly accelerated since the assasination of Jovenel Moïse, the first Haitian president killed in office since 1915.


The deep roots of gang rule 

Though Haiti has a long history of politically motivated militias — from the Zinglins and Piquets of Faustin Soulouque the mid-1800s, to the Tonton Macoute of the Duvalier family dictatorship (1957- 1986) — the modern-day roots of Haiti’s gang rule can be found in a catastrophic interweaving of events in the 1990s.

 

A strangling economic embargo designed to return to power Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti’s first democratically elected president, ousted in a coup in 1991 after only seven months in office, all but destroyed what was left of Haiti’s manufacturing sector. A subsequent IMF and World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment, made with U.S. President Bill Clinton’s support, lowered Haiti’s tariffs on imported rice from 50% to 3%, turning Haiti into the world’s fifth-largest importer of U.S. rice and breaking the backbone of its peasant economy. Those who fled the countryside to the cities found few jobs waiting for them.

 

It was the children of these news arrivals — as many of the capital’s poorest neighborhoods are populated largely by country people new to the city — who became the first generation of the modern youth gangs in Haiti, a phenomenon encouraged with ruthless efficiency by Aristide and his party Fanmi Lavalas (formed in 1996) to ensure their grip on power. Aristide returned to the presidency in 2001 only to be overthrown again in a 2004 rebellion that began when a formerly loyal gang in the northern city of Gonaïves, the Lame Kanibal (Cannibal Army), turned against him in retaliation for allegedly killing their leader.

 

I knew many of these young, first-generation gunmen personally, and spent countless hours speaking with them in Cité Soleil, the sprawling seaside slum they called home. Although they were not typical of the inhabitants of the capital’s slums — most of whom, then as now, have no connection to guns or violence — they represented an unavoidable political force. Before their early deaths (all but one died before his 30th birthday), some spoke eloquently to me about a desperate desire to blast Haiti out of its inhuman squalor and inequality. At a certain time, one could see the good they might have done for the country. But Aristide got to them first.


Politicians have long used gangs 

In the last two decades, the armed groups in the slums — who generally call themselves baz (base, in Haiti’s Creole language) — have metastasized through generations of slain leaders and opportunistic politicians of various political stripes, seeking to monopolize the forces of arms and the votes they bring come election time. The Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK), the country's dominant force since 2011 — to which both Moïse and former President Michel Martelly belonged — embraced the baz model as enthusiastically as the Lavalas party (now, like founder Aristide himself, a historical footnote) ever did.

 

But over the years, something new began to happen, although it wasn’t immediately apparent. During a 2015 lull in the nearly 20-year tit-for-tat violence, two baz in the Martissant communities of Ti Bois and Grand Ravine waged war against each other. I went to interview the leader of the Ti Bois baz, a somber-face man then in his early 30s named Chéry Christ-Roi, known as Krisla, who had improbably succeeded in maintaining his grip on the neighborhood since the early 2000s— an extraordinary period of longevity for someone in his line of work. As we sat inside his hillside nightclub, in a spray of day-glo colors contrasting with the sweeping view of the Bay of Port-au-Prince, he said the gangs were sick of politicians using them as cannon fodder, and they might some day form a sort of alliance for good, or so I hoped.

 

Haiti’s tortured politics had different plans. In 2016, Jovenel Moïse, a businessman from Haiti’s north, was elected president after a markedly low turnout. The political opposition — consisting of opportunistic career politicians who gave themselves grand names like the secteur démocratique et populaire despite being neither democratic nor popular — flatly refused to accept the election results. The battle lines hardened.

 

Though Moïse oversaw the construction of miles of roads, and a nascent effort to restructure Haiti’s faltering energy grid — lashing out at “a corrupt oligarchy” and vowing to free from their grasp a “captured state — an audit of the Venezuelan low-cost oil program, PetroCaribe, claimed that firms linked to Moïse cashed in on an embezzlement scheme. A civil society movement, under the slogan Kot kòb PetroCaribe a? (Where is the PetroCaribe money?), demanded accountability for the funds, along with an end to corruption and other government abuses. Striking a modus vivendi with the political opposition whose first demand was that Moïse resign so they could get in (opposition lawmakers twice vandalized Haiti’s parliament in the company of their partisans to prevent Moïse’s choice for Prime Minister from going to a vote), the civil society, perhaps unwittingly, became part of a drama bigger than themselves that was unfolding.


The Rise of "Barbecue"


In November 2017, a police raid in Grand Ravine ended in the deaths of at least two police officers and 10 civilians in what some called a police massacre. One of the policemen involved, Jimmy Chérizier— better known by his nickname, Barbecue — abandoned his post and returned to his power base in the capital’s Lower Delmas quarter, where he founded an illegal armed group, allegedly with ties to the Moïse government —a claim Moïse and Barbecue both denied. In 2018, Barbecue was accused of participating in a massacre in the Port-au-Prince slum of La Saline that killed 26, according to a United Nations report. Barbecue and two officials of the Moïse government were sanctioned by the U.S. State Department for their alleged roles in the killings.

 

While the Moïse government negotiated with the PNH over the police department’s quest to form a union, a gang called Fantôme 509 (Haiti’s country code) emerged, claiming to be dissident police. The group wore masks and shot their guns in the air, at vehicles and into government buildings. Fantôme 509 was widely viewed as a wing of the opposition. In June 2020, Barbecue, dressed in a suit and carrying a machine gun, held a press conference to announce the formation of the G9 an fanmi e alye, an alliance of armed groups around the city, including Krisla’s Ti Bois baz. Though Barbecue stated that he was not “pro-government or pro-opposition,” he released several videos of himself surrounded by an armed, masked cadre and expounding on the political issues of the day. His Twitter account, which had a large following, has since been suspended. 


Gang war goes viral on social media 

But Barbecue was hardly the only boss in town, and not the only one to grasp the power of social media.

 

Across Route Nationale 2 from Grand Ravine and Ti Bois, in the Village de Dieu slum, Arnel Joseph, a politically connected gang leader, who reigned over the 5 Segonn (5 Seconds) gang until fleeing in an attempt to avoid arrest, was killed by police in February 2021. The following month, Haitian police tried to storm the slum in a raid that ended with six police officers dead: their final moments recorded by gloating gang members who shared the footage on social media.

 

Arnel Joseph's successor at the helm of the 5 Segonn (5 Seconds) gang was a different character altogether, and  the footage of the slain policemen was only the beginning of his social media war. Going by the nom de guerre Izo, the new strongman of 5 Segonn presides over a kidnapping empire, the proceeds of which he uses to fund slick videos of himself and his gunmen as he spits rhymes while strutting through the slum and snorting copious amounts of cocaine (He is, at it happens, a lyricist of no small talent). Beyond his musical pursuits, however, Izo has used social media and apps like WhatsApp to boast of his battlefield success and terrorize his rivals. Last month, while bragging about weapons acquired during fighting with gangs from the rival G9-affiliated - slum of La Saline, 5 Segonn displayed the firearms perched on the dead body of one of their enemies. In another video, Izo dismembers the cadaver of a rival he had purchased from the gang in Grand Ravine, and then begins to cook the viscera in a pot.

 

The 400 Mawozo have also shown a fondness for social media. The gang’s leader, Joseph Wilson, alias Lanmò San Jou  (Death Comes Unannounced), recently recorded himself and his gunmen (who appear to be in their early teens) requesting the “paperwork” of motorists traveling between Port-au-Prince and the Dominican Republic. Last month, 400 Mawozo gunmen murdered a police officer inside a church, spirited the body away and disseminated footage of themselves mulitalitng the corpse.

 

Wilson, believed to be a houngan, or vodou priest (vodou, despite its reputation in the West, is a religion like any other, combining both light and dark elements), has availed himself of the authority of such a role. I have seen videos of him and other 400 Mawozo members at fêtes involving coffins and other accouterments of death. The possible spiritual elements of the violence in Haiti today in some ways echo the gruesome public displays of Charles Taylor, during the 1989-1997 Liberian Civil War of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), who cannily co-opted some of the trappings of the Poro Society — a male secret society in West Africa — to add an aura of authority to his military might.

 

The violence has more immediate ways of revealing its interconnection. In the shantytown of Canaan, whose population exploded when thousands of Haitians displaced by the 2010 earthquake resettled there, a gang recently filmed themselves firing in the air as they referred to themselves as “the Taliban.”


The gang state 

Although the government of Prime Minister Ariel Henry — who assumed power under controversial circumstances after the assasaniation of Jovenel Moïse — has frequently been accused of having ties to gangs, the gunmen are now making direct attacks on the symbols of the state. In June, 5 Segonn gunmen stormed Port-au-Prince’s Palais de Justice, seat of the highest judicial authority in the capital, and have occupied it since, chasing off judges, clerks, prosecutors, police and staff. The authorities have made no attempt to retake the building, as its armed occupants strut about its rooms destroying files. In July, 400 Mawozo gang members set fire to the Croix-des-Bouquets prosecutor's office. Government services — customs, the central bank and other entities once housed in downtown Port-au-Prince — are abandoning the center of the city to the gunmen and moving to more secure locales, such as the airport or to far-flung suburbs.

 

“They're trying to establish some kind of recognition as a force or a state within the state,” said a conflict resolution specialist, and friend, who works in some of the capital’s most marginalized neighborhoods. “Any talk of elections without taking care of these guys doesn't make sense.”

 

More than the politically allied “posses” of Jamaica, which the Haitian gangs once most closely resembled, the armed groups in the country look more and more like the all-demolishing whirlwinds of the Islamic State, for whom killing publicly and ritualistically is as much an affirmation of power and mission as the success of any geopolitical goals.

 

In a very direct way, the violence also connects Haiti to its giant neighbor to the north, the United States.

 

In July, a ship arriving from Florida at Haiti’s Port-de-Paix was discovered to be carrying 120,000 cartridges, three handguns, 30 magazines, 20 Ak-47s and $3,890. That same month, seven illegal pistols were confiscated from another ship from the U.S., stopped at the same port. The government responded by freeing two of the men who had been arrested for alleged involvement in the scheme and firing the government official who’d overseen seizure of the weapons. Meanwhile, several suspect containers at a wharf in Port-au-Prince were found to contain 9mm pistols, 14,646 cartridges, 140 magazines and 18 assault rifles.

The gangs are coordinating 

As the country roils amid criminal anarchy, the government of President Ariel Henry has remained largely silent, apparently secure in the support of such foreign actors as the U.S., France and the U.N. Mission in Haiti. The fact that both RNDDH and a now-stalled investigation by the Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire (DCPJ) into the murder of Jovenel Moïse showed that Henry had spoken twice to Joseph Félix Badio — believed to be a key link in the plot to murder the president — on the night of the assassination, appears not to phase them. The government’s detachment from the trauma of its citizens was also vividly illustrated when, during a regular bout of gang violence, the prime minister spent a glittering evening at the posh Hotel Montana to celebrate “Europe Day'' with various foreign diplomats. The elegant hotel also serves as the base for the Montana Accord, a group of civil society actors and veteran politicos who “elected” a president and prime minister last year, yet whose authority barely extends beyond the lobby.

 

Last month, an attempt by the G-9 to take over the Cité Soleil, under the control of baz leader Gabriel Jean-Pierre, aka Ti Gabriel, who heads a rival coalition of gangs called the G-Pèp, failed. It was foiled when 5 Segonn rushed to Gabriel’s aid ferrying gunmen in motorboats along the coast, one of at least three instances that the group has used boats in recent months. The attack failed, but not before more than 200 people — mostly civilians—  were killed and many thousands displaced. The onslaught, most observers agree, was unleashed to acquire territory in order to control voting centers should Haiti’s long-delayed elections ever be held.

 

It was around this time that the U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince tweeted a photo of Chargé d’Affaires Eric Stromayer (the U.S. has not had an ambassador in Haiti since October 2021) grinning broadly behind a stoney faced Ariel Henry, saying the two had “discussed recent security gains.” This must have come as news to Haitians desperately trying to flee the abattoir of gang violence.

 

Stromayer’s meeting with Henry occurred the same week the RNDDH accused Henry of “continuing to supply the gangs with weapons and ammunition to put an end to the lives of the police, to discourage them in their work and to block justice.” And just weeks after the Episcopal Conference of Haiti demanded: “Why does the State not act?" A few days after the meeting, clashes between the G9-affiliated gang Krache Dife (Fire Spitters) and its rivals turned downtown Port-au-Prince into a war zone, with gunmen wearing police uniforms participating in the fighting and a cadre of “barefoot child soldiers” — as one local media outlet called them — firing automatic weapons. Around the same time, when a delegation of evangelical Protestants showed up one afternoon to clean the streets of the Pont-Breya section of Grand Ravine, gunmen shot the pastor's wife dead. Gang coordination seems to increase by the week. Sensing a common enemy, when police began a sustained campaign against 400 Mawozo this month, the gang sent word to Ti Makak, who helpfully distracted them with his own eruption of violence miles away — ending the life of Yvon Buissereth.


Foreign ‘help’ is making everything worse 

More than 550 people were murdered in greater Port-au-Prince between January and June, according to the Commission épiscopale de l’église catholique romaine Justice et Paix. An additional 200 victims from Cité Soleil were added to that death toll last month. More than 100 police officers were slain between June 2021 and June 2022. And the bloodshed appears to be spreading. In late July, clashes between armed groups in rural Petite-Rivière-de-l’Artibonite, nearly 75 miles from Port-au-Prince, left at least 20 dead and several buildings burned. The OAS recently issued a mea culpa, saying that Haiti’s crisis was “a direct result of the actions taken by the country’s endogenous forces and by the international community,” and arguing that “the international community’s presence in Haiti has amounted to one of the worst and clearest failures implemented and executed within the framework of any international cooperation.” But it, as well, seems to have little idea how to stem the tide of violence.

 

“Every day, the insecurity in Haiti grows and the population becomes more imprisoned,” Haitian sociologist Laënnec Hurbon recently told me. “The prime minister is deaf and blind and the international community does not show the slightest empathy in the face of the country's tumble toward the abyss.”

Michael Deibert Speaking To Al Jazeera on Anniversary of Assassination of Haiti's Jovenel Moïse

Freedom Soup and the Liberation of Haiti

Freedom Soup and the Liberation of Haiti 

The cuisine, a combination of African and European influences, also tells the story of this complex country’s revolutionary heritage

By Michael Deibert 

Newlines Magazine

(Read the original article here)

On the first day of the year in 1804, at the Place d’Armes in the dusty city of Gonaïves, gazing out onto the turquoise waters of the Golfe de la Gonâve off Haiti, a 46-year-old military leader who had been born into slavery on a plantation near Grande-Rivière-du-Nord unveiled a text that still cries out from across the centuries.

“Citizens,” it began,

it is not enough to have expelled the barbarians who have bloodied our land for two centuries; it is not enough to have restrained those ever-evolving factions that one after another mocked the specter of liberty. … We must, with one last act of national authority, forever assure the empire of liberty in the country of our birth; we must take any hope of re-enslaving us away from the inhuman government that for so long kept us in the most humiliating torpor. In the end we must live independent or die.

Independence or death… let these sacred words unite us and be the signal of battle and of our union.

With those words, Haiti declared its independence from France after a 13-year war of liberation and abolished slavery, the first nation to do so. The military leader who had overseen this victory, Jean-Jacques Dessalines, had taken up the torch of Haitian liberation after its after its most charismatic initial proponent, Toussaint Louverture, was kidnapped by the forces of the dictator Napoleon Bonaparte and died in a lonely prison cell in the Jura Mountains (a fate possibly abetted by Dessalines’ own political maneuvering). The formerly French colony of Saint-Domingue would heretofore be known as Haiti, its original Taíno name.

Hardly alone in his campaign against what was then one of the world’s great military powers — marked by victories such as the Battle of Vertières, outside of modern-day Cap-Haïtien (known then as Cap-Français), in November 1803 — Dessalines was aided by a now-mythic cast of characters. There was Henry (often-written Henri) Christophe, an English-speaking former slave, likely born in Grenada. There was Alexandre Pétion, son of a wealthy French father, and free women of mixed African and European heritage who narrowly avoided death as an infant during a 1770 earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince. And, deceased on the long road to liberty, were patriots like Suzanne Bélair, better known as Sanité Bélair, an “affranchi” (free person of color) who took an active part in combat against Napoleon’s forces and became a lieutenant in Louverture’s army. When she was executed by the French she cried “Viv libète! Aba esclavaj!” (Long live freedom! Down with slavery!)

Tradition has it that in celebration of their victory, the victorious Haitian forces sat down to “soup joumou,” a fortifying soup hinting at the promise of abundance that the hideousness of slavery had denied Haiti’s people and which earlier this year was given the distinction of being part of “the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity” by UNESCO. The soup itself — an enticing and filling mélange of squash, onions, peppers, beef and pasta — not only has historical resonance but also offers a tantalizing introduction to the rich and varied cuisine of Haiti, something I was able to experience firsthand during several years of living there and a quarter century of visiting the country.

“It is an ode to freedom, a ritual that we participate in saying we believe in a better tomorrow and coming together,” says Dominique Dupuy, Haiti’s delegate to UNESCO. “When you go through this cascade of traumas, resilience comes at a cost, but let’s recognize that we ourselves have the power to push through. We’ve had bad years, but we’re a great people.”

Beset by plotting from foreign powers and what the Haitian author Frédéric Marcelin would later characterize as “civil strife, fratricidal slaughters, social miseries … and idolatrous militarism,” Haiti would soon fall into violent political factionalism. After declaring himself emperor, Dessalines would be assassinated at present-day Pont-Rouge in Port-au-Prince in October 1806. Civil war would break out, with the country divided between Henry Christophe’s Kingdom of Haiti in the north (where Christophe declared himself King Henry I) and Alexandre Pétion’s Republic of Haiti in the south. Following the deaths of both Christophe and Pétion, the nation would finally be reunited under the rule of Pétion’s successor, Jean-Pierre Boyer.

“The revolution is often told in only a victorious narrative, but it involves a lot of bloodshed and intra-group fighting,” says Yveline Alexis, an associate professor of Africana studies at Oberlin College. “But this also not only tells us about how unity and disunity can exist while fighting oppressors but how, in the end, Haiti will be left standing.”

But the dream of Haiti and the singular heroism of its initial accomplishment — defeating a colonial power and eradicating an infernal system — never died, and as the heavy winds of the country’s political struggle blew forward, the people of Haiti — “les enfants des héros” (children of heroes) as the author Lyonel Trouillot called them — carried on that legacy with their food.

When I worked as a journalist in Haiti in the early 2000s, one of my favorite things to do at the end of the week was to leave my flat in the bougainvillea-draped neighborhood of Pacot and head to the Portail Léogâne, the outdoor transit hub used for traveling south out of the city.

There, one could easily find a tap-tap, as Haiti’s brightly colored shared passenger vans are called, heading for the neighborhoods of Martissant, Carrefour and Mariani (a journey that is now very perilous because of the nonstop fighting of politically aligned armed groups called “baz,” or base). After hopping on board, sensuous kompa music playing from the tap-tap’s sound system, one would sail past dilapidated hotels that hark back to the days when Haiti was a tourist destination with outdoor markets where vendors sold their wares under the open sky.

When the tap-tap pauses briefly at a crossroads before continuing south through mountains often fecund after rain and dotted by rainbows, market women run up to the vehicle’s sides, offering travelers tasty snacks such as “douce macoss,” an overpoweringly sweet tricolored candy that, along with Faustin Soulouque, who ran the country first as president and then as emperor from 1847 to 1859, is perhaps the most famous product of the nearby city of Petit-Goâve, a once-beautiful city devastated by Haiti’s January 2010 earthquake. Or they would offer “tablet pistach,” Haiti’s version of peanut brittle.

After an hour or so of the tap-tap’s negotiating serpentine mountain roads, the southern city of Jacmel, where South American liberation hero Simón Bolívar was given shelter by Haiti’s rebel leaders (no one else would take him), appears below, glittering like a jewel next to the tumbling surf.

Once in Jacmel, I would disembark and transfer to a moto taxi to travel the 10 or so miles to the beach cottage that I was renting. There, one could splash in the surf under the gaze of the brooding inland mountains and feast on exquisite “lambi creole” (conch with a uniquely spicy Haitian sauce) and “langouste” (lobster prepared with a distinct smoky flair). In Jacmel itself, on a weekend evening, citizens and stray foreigners would go to and fro between the restaurants and music clubs, the streets lit by the flickering orange glow of the kerosene lamps of the vendors as they offered “griot” (fried pork) to passersby. As the sun set, it was customary to pour a libation of Haiti’s exquisite rum, Barbancourt Cinq étoiles (still, for my money, the best rum in the world) or, for the more adventurous, to sample the various strains of “tafia,” the highly potent raw rum sold in jerrycans at roadside stands (though the best tafia is widely considered to be consumed in the temperate climes of the mountain town of Kenscoff, above Port-au-Prince).

Over the two-and-a-half decades I’ve spent visiting Haiti, the majesty and ebullient tale told by Haiti’s rich cuisine has accompanied me every step. Haiti’s food evokes its sophisticated and varied roots, from the Parisian-style boulangeries that one can find in the tree-draped squares of areas like the Port-au-Prince suburb of Pétionville to the unpretentious “lalo,” a spinach stew served over white rice and often bought from large pots along the road. And if you have never bought some “marinade” (a seasoned batter patty) from a woman selling them roadside, have you ever lived? The same question could be posed if you’ve never enjoyed delicious “poulet boucané” (smoked chicken) on the terrace of Kay Foun, overlooking the busy street in Saint-Marc, accompanied by a Prestige beer so cold that ice still clings to the glass of the bottle, or eaten “pintade créole” (guinea hen in a spicy sauce served with fried plantains and beans and rice) on a (relatively) cool autumn evening.

Regional dishes also abound, from the unique use of coconut around Jacmel in the south to “poul an sòs ak nwa” (cashew chicken) in the north, where one can eat it during an evening of carousing along the Carenage Boulevard that abuts the ocean. In the morning one can take in the stirring sight of Sans-Souci and the Citadelle Laferrière, a palace and fort combination built by Christophe with views across the plains of northern Haiti. Popular in Jérémie, a lovely town on the northern shore of on the northern shore of the Grand’Anse department and known as “la cité des poètes” (the city of poets), one finds “tonmtonm,” a filling breadfruit-based dish.

Haiti continues to struggle with its demons, systemic and structural problems greater than any one politician or political party. When Haiti’s president Jovenel Moïse was assassinated last July — the fifth president from the country’s north to be killed since independence — and as gang wars and narrow political infighting continue to rack the capital, it’s easy, particularly for outsiders, to forget this culinary lineage, which in a real way has freedom and a revolutionary heritage in every morsel.

“The Haitian kitchen is a concentration of our Afro and European influences,” says Paul Toussaint, a Haitian chef and restaurateur whose restaurant in Montreal, Canada, Kamúy, mixes traditional Haitian cooking with international elements. “When I am cooking Haitian cuisine, I feel like I am combining those heritages. It’s a love story with our history, and there’s a lot of meaning in our food.”

Sunday, April 17, 2022

Restoring Glory to a Baltimore Neighborhood

Restoring Glory to a Baltimore Neighborhood

The Sandtown-Winchester area burst into America’s consciousness with the murder by police of Freddie Gray in 2015. But the struggle to recapture its greatness predates one unhappy Sunday morning

Michael Deibert

New Lines Magazine

(Read the original article here)

Humanity pulses like blood through a vein along West Baltimore’s Pennsylvania Avenue, a whirl of people moving beneath a cloud-dappled winter evening sky illuminated with blazes of crimson fire from the setting sun.

At the Avenue Bakery, Jim Hamlin is dishing out dinner rolls, Jewish apple cake and morsels of the history of the storied Baltimore neighborhood of Sandtown-Winchester, whose trajectory mirrors that of many just like it around the United States.

“I was fortunate that I grew up on the cusp of segregation and integration,” says Hamlin, a 72-year-old who grew up in Sandtown and opened the bakery after working for UPS for 35 years. “Pennsylvania Avenue was the business district for this community. The Royal Theatre was still open and there was nothing but nightclubs, restaurants, barber shops, all the staples we needed in our community. Some were owned by African-Americans, some were owned by Jewish folks. It was the thriving entertainment center for Baltimore from the 1930s to the 1960s.”

Recent decades, however, have been less kind to Sandtown. The neighborhood erupted into the national consciousness following the April 2015 murder of Freddie Gray by officers of the Baltimore Police Department and subsequent protests that spiraled into riots that rocked the city. (Though Gray’s death was ruled a homicide by a medical examiner, attempts to prosecute the six officers involved ended in acquittal and dropping of the charges against them.)

But the story of Sandtown’s struggle long predates that early Sunday morning when the 25-year-old Gray’s path crossed with the police outside The Gilmor Homes, a now largely demolished public housing facility named after a wealthy merchant family that included a Confederate cavalry officer. Those struggles say much about the attitude of successive city, state and federal governments toward some of the most disadvantaged and marginalized people in the United States and the herculean efforts of those in the community to rescue it from the jaws of despair.

Settled by Europeans on what was largely a traditional Native American hunting ground in the second half of the 1600s, Baltimore soon boomed thanks to extensive trade with Britain’s sugar-producing Caribbean colonies in products such as grain and tobacco, the commerce facilitated by the extensive use of an economic model based on slavery. Decades after the U.S. won its independence from Great Britain, in September 1814, during the Battle of Baltimore fought during the War of 1812, a local lawyer, Francis Scott Key, penned the words to what would later become “The Star-Spangled Banner,” the national anthem of the United States. Among its lyrics is one line, from the third verse and thus not performed often today, that gives a hint of the flavor of society there: “No refuge could save the hireling and slave/From the terror of flight, or the gloom of the grave.”

Despite its northern location, Baltimore was a city that, culturally and politically, in many ways remained part of the slave-owning Deep South. Though it also boasted shipbuilding yards, sawmills and other factories, an undercurrent of violence and chaos rumbled beneath the hum of industry. In 1835, the Baltimore bank riot saw a three-day spree of pillage and looting after the collapse of the Bank of Maryland resulted in the overnight evaporation of millions of dollars in depositors’ savings. In October 1849, the author Edgar Allan Poe was plucked “in distress” from its streets wearing clothes that were not his own and died a few days later. In April 1861, at the very beginning of the Civil War, Confederate secessionist sympathizers attacked members of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania state militia regiments en route to Washington, sparking a clash that left four soldiers and 12 rioters dead. As the war progressed, Abraham Lincoln found it expedient to clap George William Brown, the city’s secessionist mayor, in jail for more than a year. After the war, the city again saw riots in 1877 when the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad cut the wages and reduced the hours of its workers, leading to a clash between civilians and the National Guard, federal troops and local police in a melee that left at least 10 dead.

But the postwar period and into the first half of the 20th century also saw a flourishing of Baltimore’s African-American community in general and in Sandtown in particular. Factories like the Mount Vernon Mill, a cotton textile mill in nearby Jones Falls, provided plentiful employment and Pennsylvania Avenue itself became a glittering mecca for Black culture, with the nearby Royal Theatre (built in 1922) and the Penn Hotel serving as anchors for the area’s artistic milieu. Thurgood Marshall, who as an attorney successfully argued Brown v. Board of Education before the Supreme Court (which ruled that state laws establishing racial segregation in public schools were unconstitutional) and later became the court’s first African-American justice, lived in Sandtown. So did jazz musicians like Billie Holiday, Cab Calloway (whose songs such as “Minnie the Moocher ” and “Reefer Man” in some ways encapsulated the district’s libertine appeal) and Chick Webb. For a touch of the bucolic, the horse-drawn carts of the arabbers, or street vendors, plied the lanes of the neighborhood carrying vegetables, fruits, blocks of ice and other necessities. The economic development of the city was frequently spoken of in terms of a “black butterfly,” with its majority African-American population spreading like a butterfly’s wings on either side of a highly moneyed white corridor of real estate running through Baltimore’s center.

“The community then, when it came to economic opportunity, there were many options for young people,” says Jim Hamlin, whose bakery features photographs of Sandtown’s notables and a mural celebrating some of its famous figures. On the first Saturday of each month from May to September, the bakery hosts concerts in its small courtyard.

When the civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. was slain on the evening of April 4, 1968, the shots that killed him may have been fired in Memphis, Tennessee, but they were heard in many other U.S. cities, including Baltimore. The city was marked by a week of rioting after the assassination, unrest that hit Sandtown particularly hard (Maryland Gov. Spiro Agnew — later Richard Nixon’s vice president — responded by sending the National Guard to the city and then publicly lambasting local Black leaders for their supposed “failure” in the face of the unrest). The Pennsylvania Avenue business district was devastated, with many businesses opting not to reopen, and by 1971 the Royal Theatre had been demolished, a sadly symbolic act for a community rocked back on its heels. Eventually, hundreds of homes would be abandoned and fall into various states of disrepair.

Baltimore was not spared from the violence associated with the crack epidemic of the late 1980s and early 1990s, nor, along with it, the glaring inequality of law enforcement and sentencing that targeted poor, urban (frequently African-American and Latino) communities. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 led to the notorious “100 to 1” ratio in sentencing, which meant individuals faced far longer sentences for offenses involving crack cocaine than for offenses involving a similar amount of powder cocaine, and leading to African-Americans often serving an equal amount of time in prison for nonviolent drug offenses as arrested whites did for violent offenses. This disparity was not corrected until President Barack Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act into law in August 2010.

A level of intergenerational poverty began to afflict neighborhoods like Sandtown. According to the 2017 Baltimore City Neighborhood Health Profile, the median household income in the neighborhood is $24,374, a little more than half of what it is in the city as a whole, while the poverty rate is 50.3%, as compared with a citywide rate of is 28.8%. Progress often seems tenuous. According to a 2015 study by Loyola University’s Peter Rosenblatt and Johns Hopkins University’s Stefanie DeLuca, after an uptick in home ownership at the beginning of the millennium, the 2008 housing crisis led to 350 foreclosures in the neighborhood in just a two-year period.

“There are people who cannot take care of their families or ever get out of their current situations, so they participate in the street economy, and those rules are totally different than the roles we play by, if you make a mistake, it could be your life,” says Ashiah Parker of the No Boundaries Coalition, a resident-led advocacy organization based in Sandtown. “There are people in this city who are fourth or fifth generation impoverished, who have never had a member of their family go to college or live outside of the housing projects.”

Nor has law enforcement been blameless in this dynamic. A 2016 probe by the U.S. Department of Justice found that the Baltimore Police Department had engaged “in a pattern or practice of conduct that violates the Constitution or federal law” including “making unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests; using enforcement strategies that produce severe and unjustified disparities in the rates of stops, searches and arrests of African Americans; using excessive force; and retaliating against people engaging in constitutionally protected expression.” The report found that the practices were “driven by systemic deficiencies in [the department’s] policies, training, supervision, and accountability structures that fail to equip officers with the tools they need to police effectively and within the bounds of the federal law.”

Many in the city believe these practices solidified during the 1999 to 2007 mayoralty of Martin O’Malley, who went on to become governor of Maryland and ran an unsuccessful bid for the Democratic nomination for president in 2016. Though homicides fell during O’Malley’s tenure as mayor (and arrests increased dramatically), the systemic, structural causes behind crime remained stubbornly resistant to correction. In 2010, the city settled for $870,000 a lawsuit brought against it four years earlier by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) on behalf of 14 who said their arrests were part of a systematic policy of arrests without cause.

“In Maryland, if you are convicted of a felony, even as a 15-year-old, it can never be expunged from your record,” Ashiah Parker explains. “Walmart checks that. We’re not even talking about becoming a top tier accountant. You can’t have a criminal background and go into senior housing, for example. … We need to do something radical because we talk about second chances, but we don’t really offer them.”

Much of the violence, however, comes from within the community itself. In January 2022, Baltimore’s Child Fatality Review, which brings together various city agencies and experts, released a report on 208 child fatality cases over the previous five years, finding that homicides are the leading cause of death of children in the city, with 90% of the fatalities involving children of color (in a city in which people of color make up about two-thirds of the population). One of the victims was 13-year-old Maliyah Turner, who was shot and killed outside the Lillian Jones Recreation Center in Sandtown, where she had arrived for band practice, this past November.

“It’s painful for me to be a person who God has selected to be a servant to the people to see the suffering of those who God created in his likeness and his image to be a little lower than the angels,” says lifelong Sandtown resident Elder C.W. Harris, the founding pastor of Newborn Community of Faith Church, who, along with jazz musician Todd Marcus, established an organization called Intersection of Change to address and ameliorate poverty-related challenges. “It is inhumane. God is crying because of the way we are treating one another.”

“We are reconcilers,” says Harris. “And those who have lived here have to receive the encouragement and belief that they can do it. The nation should be ashamed of the way this side of central West Baltimore is being treated. We can stop all this if we show some humanity, but we’re not showing any.”

Among those on the front lines of combating violence are men like Wayne Brewton. A 61-year-old released from prison in March 2017 after serving a 31-year sentence for murder, Brewton is what is known as a “violence interrupter” with Safe Streets Baltimore, a violence prevention program operated by Catholic Charities in collaboration with the Baltimore City Department of Health and the Mayor’s Office for Neighborhood Safety and Engagement.

“The nature of civilization doesn’t change. There’s always going to be some version of greed, jealousy and hate,” says Brewton in his spare, tidy apartment as he reaches down to pet a cat purring around his ankles. “And I was led down a path of total destruction.”

It is a fate he hopes to help today’s young people avoid, along with the lure of images of success that can confront them on a daily basis.

“Picture yourself as a child, going to school. You probably haven’t eaten in a couple of days. The teacher probably doesn’t care much about you. You have to walk past nine or 10 blocks of abandoned homes, so you admire the ones who get up and fight through that,” says Brewton. “The main important factor when you deal with the youth of today [is that] you have to listen and stop trying to make decisions for them and they are going to tell you what they need. But you have to earn their trust.”

It is not an approach that comes without risks. In January, 29-year-old DaShawn McGrier, a Safe Streets violence interrupter, was slain as part of a quadruple shooting in the McElderry Park neighborhood east of Sandtown. He was the third member of the organization to be shot and killed in the past year. Nevertheless, Brewton believes it is important to push on.

“A lot of the kids have never been out of Sandtown-Winchester,” Brewton notes. “We might take them to baseball games, to basketball games, to the Museum of African American History & Culture. … For about six hours, we’ll be saving some lives, maybe their own. We need the richness of community back. We’re the change we’re looking for. If you want change, you’ve got to take the initiative to make that change.”

Historically, Baltimore’s politicians themselves have often seemed unable or unwilling to confront the great challenges of communities like Sandtown. For more than a decade, from 1947 to 1959, Baltimore’s mayor was Thomas D’Alesandro Jr., the father of current House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. While mayor, D’Alesandro oversaw the dedication of a large statue of Stonewall Jackson and Robert E. Lee, seditous traitors who defended the infernal institution of slavery. The statue stood in Wyman Park until it was ordered taken down and put in storage by the Baltimore City Council in August 2017. Pelosi’s elder brother, Thomas D’Alesandro III, served as mayor for a single term that overlapped with the 1968 riots. Baltimore saw its first Black mayor, Clarence H. Burns, ascend to the office in 1987 when he took over from William Donald Schaefer following the latter’s resignation after being elected governor of Maryland. Buns was succeeded by the first elected Black mayor, Kurt Schmoke, who served from 1987 to 1999.

In more recent years, the city’s political class has been buffeted by a series of scandals. Sheila Dixon, who served as Baltimore’s mayor from January 2007 until February 2010, was convicted of embezzlement in connection with a scheme to purloin gift cards meant for Baltimore’s poorest residents. Catherine Pugh, who served as mayor from December 2016 until May 2019, pleaded guilty to wire fraud and tax evasion. In January, Baltimore State’s Attorney Marilyn Mosby was indicted on charges of perjury and making false statements on mortgage applications.

Baltimore’s current mayor, 37-year-old Brandon Scott, previously served as president of the city council and ran on a promise that he would lower Baltimore’s murders to fewer than 300 a year during his first year in office. But in Scott’s first year, 2021, the city experienced 337 homicides and 726 shootings. Scott has often seemed overwhelmed by the violence afflicting the city, in January 2022 telling a reporter that he was “pissed off” about the violence and that “if folks have something to say, get your ass on the streets, walk with us, do something. Don’t tweet, don’t talk.”

It is hard to spend any length of time in Sandtown, though, and not come away with the impression that many in the community are indeed doing something, although often away from the glare of the cameras and rather in the deep, daily work in the trenches of community-building.

“It’s rough, but I do think things can turn the corner,” says Ashiah Parker. “And I think people are still holding hope that a renaissance era can come back.”

Some in Sandtown’s younger generation hold out that same hope.

“I think a lot of youth aren’t fortunate enough to have the ability to see past the obstacles that other people put in front of you,” says 23-year-old Keyarra Johnson, an artist born and raised in the neighborhood and now a program manager with Jubilee Arts, a community arts program based in Sandtown. “But there are a lot of people in the neighborhood trying to reconnect the community with this rich history and encourage the artistic and entrepreneurial side of Sandtown.”

Midway between Pennsylvania Avenue and Presbury Street, where a fenced-in mural shows Freddie Gray’s face gazing soulfully out at the neighborhood he left seven years ago, Bryan Wright trudges an acre and a half of Sandtown under a slate-gray sky, where neat rows of tarpaulin-wreathed tunnels shelter an unexpected bounty.

On land that was initially reclaimed by Intersection of Change, Wright and other members of the Strength to Love farm cultivate a variety of mustards, kale, spinach, lettuce, bok choy, dandelion greens, arugula, turnips, carrots, garlic, onions, scallions and other victuals that they sell from their own stand at the front of the property to farmer’s markets and a variety of restaurants in the Baltimore and Washington, DC area.

A native of Tennessee, Wright had been traveling back and forth to Baltimore for the better part of 20 years before he moved there permanently to become the farm’s manager at the beginning of 2021. Built on land once occupied by row houses that were demolished in the 1990s, Strength to Love works both to be a place for returning citizens – formerly incarcerated people — to come to get job training and also as a workforce development program that provides 18-to-24-year-old Sandtown residents with agricultural training.

“In our community we talk about all the negatives. But food insecurity to me is a major crisis that no one is really dealing with,” Wright says as the “hoop houses,” as the miniature greenhouses are called, flutter in the chill breeze. “And it affects a community on multiple levels from an economic level to a health level to mental health to environmental justice to mental development in kids. This is really a project of empowerment for trying to create food security,”

It is not an easy task. It is not uncommon to find sex workers using the larger tunnels as places of work or to find addicts securing their fixes inside a tunnel. In the colder months, homeless people sometimes seek out the tunnels to get out of the biting wind and find a warmer spot.

“I don’t think the people sleeping in the high tunnels are being disrespectful to us,” Wright says. “They’re homeless and they’re looking for a warm place to sleep. But at the same time, there is a need for us to make our footprint in the community more profound.”

Across the street from an asphalt plant, the farm uses 100% organic compost and envisions expanding in the near future to include a meditation garden along with its current agricultural project.

“Why wouldn’t you put a farm here?” Wright asks rhetorically. “Doesn’t it make sense to put food where the people are at? A library or a farm, it’s all nourishment. Being able to be self-sustainable is a major weapon and I think there’s a true effort to keep people from being beggars and asking for handouts. Gardens and farms are healing places. There’s no coincidence the majority of creation stories begin in a garden. Growing your own food is a revolutionary act.”

Latin America risk outlook: emboldened criminal groups, failing states and rising climate insecurity

I spoke with Douglas Farah, Dr Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, Dr Vanessa Neumann and Dr Irene Mia under the aegis of the The International Institute for Strategic Studies to discuss the conflict outlook for Latin America, focusing on current and emerging areas of fragility, conflict hotspots and political risks with a special reference to those with regional repercussions. Our discussion can be viewed here.

In Latin America, Backers of Leftist Dictatorships Look the Other Way

In Latin America, Backers of Leftist Dictatorships Look the Other Way

As Latin American dictators marginalize and jail protesters, the leaders rely on backing from prominent but obtuse individuals and organizations

What a night it was for the delegation of the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) last June as they gazed down on the Venezuelan capital of Caracas from the five-star, luxury Gran Meliá Hotel.

“View from the dancefloor, it’s absolutely beautiful here,” tweeted delegate Jen McKinney, while fellow delegate Tom Wojcik contented himself with the words “Caracas” and images of the hotel’s glittering façade, where a room for a night costs more than 70 times the Venezuelan monthly salary.

The attendees were ostensibly in town to participate in the Congreso Bicentenario de los Pueblos del Mundo, set to commemorate the 1821 victory of Simón Bolívar over royalist forces at the Battle of Carabobo. But in fact the gathering served as a kind of magnet for partisans of the region’s various authoritarian governments. The DSA junket to Venezuela was part of a growing trend of “anti-imperialist” revolutionary tourism in Latin America where well-heeled outsiders come to glory in the necrotic splendor of dead or aging revolutionary leaders while carefully eschewing any discussion of what kind of conditions citizens in said countries live under. It is an alliance inspired not by loyalty to progressive and leftist ideals and values but of fealty to rulers and power.

In office since the 2013 death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, his successor Nicolás Maduro portrays himself and the country’s ruling Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) as vanguards of an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist nexus of regional powers including Cuba, Nicaragua and Bolivia.

As the delegation of the DSA proved, however, interest in Venezuela’s government does not extend to curiosity about the country’s tumultuous history or tormented present. Visiting Chávez’s gravesite, DSA member Sean Estelle tweeted that former President Carlos Andrés Pérez — the mercurial populist who nationalized the oil industry and served as vice president of the Socialist International for 16 years — was a “right winger.”

The incuriosity was complemented by an intolerance for critique or even discussion. Venezuela’s Partido Socialismo y Libertad, itself a left party largely inspired by the Argentine Trotskyist leader Nahuel Moreno, wrote that the DSA delegation “lost the opportunity to meet with worker activists, feminists, the LGBTQ community, indigenous activists, peasants and youth from the popular sectors and the independent left.” As Venezuelans begged the DSA to take a more nuanced approach to the country, DSA member Austin Gonzalez sniffed on Twitter: “Something i would appreciate most is if people did not try to talk down to me when it comes to Venezuela…I’m fully aware of everything going on.” Later, after the DSA was given an opportunity to meet Maduro himself (lovingly documented on DSA social media and by Venezuela’s state-run Telesur network), Gonzalez gushed that “who I met was not a dictator” but “a humble man who cares deeply about his people.”

So, if one takes the DSA — an organization with which at least four U.S. members of Congress (Jamaal Bowman, Cori Bush, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib) claim affiliation — at their word, that they were indeed “fully aware of what was going on,” exactly what kind of regime were they giving their full-throated endorsement to? And beyond the gates of the Gran Meliá and the conference halls of the Congreso, what kind of reality do Venezuelans face every day?

According to the International Organization for Migration, more than 5.6 million Venezuelans have fled the country in recent years, many living in extremely precarious conditions in neighboring countries such as Brazil and Colombia. The 2020-21 Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida (National Survey of Living Conditions) from the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello in Caracas found that 76.6% of Venezuela’s 28 million residents live in extreme poverty. A 2020 World Food Program report ranked Venezuela among the top four countries worldwide suffering from food insecurity, just behind Yemen, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan. In a 2020 bulletin, Caritas Venezuela noted that over the past year there had been a 73% increase in levels of acute malnutrition in children under 5. All this being the case, it was perhaps in questionable taste for DSA delegation member Marvin Gonzalez to tweet out photos of his lunch fare while bragging that he “had a dope ass sancococo today!”

When one points out statistics confirming the destitution, the automatic response among DSA types — almost a catechism at this point — is that U.S. sanctions are to blame for Venezuela’s woes. That, simply put, is a lie, but a lie whose eternal repetition some apparently believe will transform it into truth.

During the 2002-03 strike at Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) — the state oil company that Carlos Andrés Pérez had nationalized — the Chávez government fired 19,000 career employees, replacing them with political flunkies, reneging on deals with oil companies, stealing assets and failing to reinvest in the industry. It was a recipe for disaster. Nevertheless, in 2013, just before Venezuela’s economy began its terrifying downward spiral, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) co-director Mark Weisbrot, a longtime acolyte of the regime and certainly a contender for worst economist in the world, wrote in The Guardian that warnings of the country’s impending collapse were the work of “Venezuela haters” and “the international and Venezuelan media” responsible for peddling a false “catastrophic view” of the country’s economy, when in fact “economic disaster was always just around the corner but never quite happened.”

Some six years later, in a 2019 report co-authored with Jeffrey Sachs (an economist whose shock therapy created chaos in Russia in the 1990s), Weisbrot attempted to argue that sanctions caused 40,000 deaths from 2017 to 2018, using the bizarre metric of comparing Venezuelan and Colombian oil production before and after a 2017 round of U.S. sanctions against the regime. An analysis of CEPR’s study by the Brookings Institute published a few weeks later concluded that “the bulk of the deterioration in living standards occurred long before the sanctions were enacted in 2017,” with “worsening trends across all of the socio-economic indicators … well before the sanctions were imposed.”

A culture of robber barons, the famous “boligarchs” who preached socialist revolution but practiced savage capitalism, came to the fore. One official alone — Chávez’s former energy czar Javier Alvarado — stands accused in various legal challenges of diverting $15 million from PDVSA as he lived lavishly and acquired homes in Madrid, Cartagena and Miami. Last year the Swiss newspaper 24 heures reported how Zurich police have identified questionable billions linked to the Venezuelan state in hundreds of bank accounts in Switzerland. This past June, Spain’s El País reported on a vast network circumventing U.S. sanctions on Venezuela traveling through 30 countries and moving money among various tax havens to create opaque multimillion-dollar businesses.

A Human Rights Watch report on a series of roiling April 2017 protests against the government concluded that “security forces and armed pro-government groups attacked protesters in the streets, using extreme and at times lethal force, causing dozens of deaths and hundreds of injuries.” The report went on to detail the torture that detainees were subject to: electric shocks, severe beatings, asphyxiation and sexual abuse including rape. That same year, pro-government thugs stormed a meeting of the opposition-dominated Asamblea Nacional, savaging legislators and their staff and leaving them bloodied and injured. A subsequent Human Rights Watch report from 2019 characterized the actions of the government’s Fuerza de Acciones Especiales (FAES) — a branch of the Policía Nacional Bolivariana that many Venezuelans consider as little more than a death squad — as committing “serious human rights violations [and] abusive policing practices in low-income communities.” From 2016 to 2019 alone, the Venezuelan police and security forces had killed nearly 18,000 people for alleged “resistance to authority.” A July 2019 statement from the Programa Venezolano de Educación-Acción en Derechos Humanos (PROVEA) human rights organization decried what it said had become “a factory for executions” in poor neighborhoods where security forces would burst in late at night, kidnap suspects (often those alleged to have participated in political demonstrations) and then summarily kill them. Another PROVEA report detailed how, in the state of Lara, Venezuelan security forces committed at least 135 extrajudicial killings in the first six months of 2020 alone. A report in Peru’s El Comercio detailed how, in the poor Caracas barrio of José Félix Ribas (a 20-minute drive from the Gran Meliá where the DSA delegation stayed), the FAES murdered at least 10 people in January 2019 after residents had joined a massive protest against Maduro. A 411-page 2020 report by United Nations investigators implicated Maduro and other high-ranking officials in systematic human rights abuses, including killings, torture and sexual violence, amounting to crimes against humanity.

With just an eight-minute drive from their hotel, the DSA delegation could have spoken to the employees of the Hospital Clínico Universitario de Caracas, where most employees are paid less than $1 per month by the regime; doctors and nurses are forced to bring chlorine from home to clean the facilities and desperately search for sutures, gloves or masks though private donations; and employees freely admit (as they did in a June 2021 article in the newspaper El Nacional) that the government had “destroyed” the institution.

The DSA members were far from the only arrivistes in town. Also in Caracas for the Congreso was Vijay Prashad, director of the Tricontinental Institute for Social Research and Manolo De Los Santos, described as a “researcher” for Tricontinental and the co-director of The People’s Forum. During their visit, Prashad posed for a portrait with a member of the security services terrorizing Venezuela while De Los Santos raved on Twitter about the pair’s “unforgettable evening with a dear comrade” (Maduro). The People’s Forum has recently begun boosting an organization called BreakThrough News, which also had correspondents on the ground in Venezuela at the time. BreakThrough News includes among its commentators those who previously worked with the In the NOW and Soapbox video channels, produced by Maffick LLC, a Los Angeles-based social media digital content company frequently identified as “Russia state-controlled” because of its links with the Russian state-funded news organization RT, an assessment a U.S. court agreed with in 2020. According to the Charity Navigator website, the address for The People’s Forum — 320 West 37th Street in New York City — is also the registered address for BreakThrough News.

In nearby Bolivia, the looking-glass perspective of much of the international left has been similar, as it tries to erase a well-documented authoritarian power grab that ended in calamity.

In a 2016 constitutional referendum, Evo Morales, who had served as president since 2006, sought voter approval to allow the president and vice president to run for an additional consecutive term. When the measure was defeated by a 51.3% majority, Morales appealed to Bolivia’s Supreme Court (stuffed with regime loyalists), which struck down the vote — the democratic expression of the Bolivian people — claiming that the American Convention on Human Rights, to which Bolivia is party, guaranteed Morales the right to run as a “human right.” In response, Luis Almagro, the secretary general of the Organization of American States (OAS), which is responsible for enforcing the treaty, said the document did “not mean the right to perpetual power.”

In Bolivia’s subsequent October 2019 general election (where a substantial amount of preelection polling showed majorities believing Morales’ reelection would be illegal), widespread reporting of irregularities and allegations that Morales’s ruling Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) artificially inflated its tally to avoid going to a second round were borne out by an OAS report that recommended new elections. Here, too, the CEPR issued its own report, unsurprisingly siding with the Morales government and failing to engage with many critiques of the irregularities identified by the OAS, the European Union and local observers. The election’s integrity was further eroded by the presence of a slew of partisan elections officials as well as computer server and chain-of-custody concerns.

After a November 2019 uprising (during which both pro- and anti-MAS forces committed violence) drove Morales from power, a conspiracy theory centered on Bolivia’s reserves of lithium took hold, much of it resting on a July 2020 tweet from eccentric Tesla founder Elon Musk, where he bragged, “We will coup whoever we want! Deal with it.” This theory was strongly undercut by observations of those such as Pablo Solón Romero, who had served as Bolivia’s ambassador to the U.N. under Morales. He noted that it was Morales himself who had thrown the country open to lithium speculators and that in the southwestern department of Potosí, for example, “the opposition to the government radicalized before the elections due to the signing of a 70-year contract without payment of royalties for the production of lithium hydroxide in the salt flats of Uyuni.” Oppression in Potosí by the MAS party party (after a year long interim presidency by Jeanine Áñez, in 2020 MAS presidential candidate Luis Arce won with 55.1% of the vote) continues today, with members of the local Comité Cívico Potosinista continuing to be subjects of police harassment and extrajudicial arrests.

But these facts are of little interest to some foreign commentators such as the former British Labour leader Jeremey Corbyn (whose fringe politics and taste for fanaticism managed to hand the party its worst electoral defeat since 1935 two years ago), who last October penned an article claiming that in the 2019 elections “the final result would hand Morales a clear first-round victory as votes from rural, indigenous-populated and Morales-supporting areas,” a view by no means universal among Bolivia’s people.

“The MAS government has been very clever in constructing a false local and international narrative of care and protection for Mother Earth (Pachamama) and respect for human and indigenous rights, which in practice does not exist,” said Alex Villca Limaco, an activist with the Coordinadora Nacional de Defensa de los Territorios Indígenas Originarios Campesinos y Áreas Protegidas de Bolivia (National Coordinator for the Defense of Indigenous Peasant Territories and Protected Areas of Bolivia or CONTIOCAP). “This has only served to distract and hide its ambition for merely extractive economic power and hegemonic and totalitarian political power … [They have] only served to continue a policy of looting, dispossession and destruction of indigenous territories and protected areas.”

The situation is far more dire in Nicaragua, where since 2007 Daniel Ortega of the ostensibly left-wing Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) has ruled as president. Since 2017, his wife, Rosario Murillo, a failed poet with more than a whiff of Lady Macbeth about her, has served as vice president. Once revered as the rebel group that helped oust dictator Anastasio Somoza from power in 1979, the FSLN has grown increasingly dictatorial, extractive and repressive during its current reign.

Since 2015, settlers in the country’s heavily indigenous northeast — whom many see as backed by the government — have killed more than 60 indigenous people, according to the Centro por la Justicia y Derechos Humanos de la Costa Atlántica de Nicaragua (CEJUDHCAN). (The FSLN has a history of violent hostility against Nicaragua’s indigenous communities, documented well in the 1980s by the geographer Bernard O. Nietschmann.) A recent report by the investigative news site Divergentes revealed that the Ortega-Murillo regime has made 60% of Nicaragua’s surface available to large international investors for mining concessions. A study – based on surveys of excess mortality – published last month by the Observatorio por la Transparencia y Anticorrupción concluded that the regime had purposely undercounted COVID-19 deaths in the country by 6,000 to 9,000.

In April 2018, the regime finally ripped away its veneer of democracy after the government’s proposal to increase taxes and cut social security benefits ignited long-standing grievances. Protests broke out around the country. The government responded with immense brutality that has continued in fits and starts ever since. A May 2018 report by Amnesty International found that in response to the protests, “the Nicaraguan government adopted a strategy of violent repression not seen in the country for years. More than 70 people were reportedly killed by the state and hundreds were seriously injured.” In December 2018, the Grupo Interdisciplinario de Expertos Independientes (GIEI), a collection of independent analysts selected by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, published a report concluding that the Ortega government “committed crimes against humanity” and that Ortega used “public institutions and pro-government armed groups to establish a repressive state apparatus, with the intention to kill and persecute those who opposed their policies.”

But among many self-described leftists, one hears little of this. As Nicaragua held farcical elections last month with all major contenders for the presidency but Ortega jailed along with over a hundred other political prisoners (the youngest believed to be 21-year-old feminist and student activist Samantha Jirón), the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) published an article praising the regime. It was written by John Perry, an expat Brit living in Nicaragua who, under the pseudonym Charles Redvers, disseminated a “confession” from student protester Valeska Sandoval made when she had a gun pointed at her head by government agents and little choice but to comply with her captors.

During the elections themselves — where the abstention rate was 81.5%, according to the Urnas Abiertas citizen watchdog organization — a carnival sideshow of figures descended on the country to be feted by a regime better known for killing, jailing and exiling journalists than accrediting them. Among them was Craig “Pasta” Jardula, an American podcaster with no experience in the country who told Business Insider that Caleb Maupin, a political commentator at Russia’s state RT propaganda organ, had invited him to come down. Though Jardula had paid for his flight from the U.S., the Nicaraguan government had “covered our rooms and food and that sort of thing” as well as the cost of his flight from Managua to a polling station in the country’s northeast. (In terms of government spending priorities, by contrast, in some of the country’s regions nearly 30% of children under 5 suffer from chronic malnutrition.) Jardula would later tweet out that Nicaragua was “a true Democratic [sic] country.” Also ubiquitous was the U.S. journalist Ben Norton, affiliated with the website The Grayzone, which has made something of a cottage industry of defending dictators and their crimes. A reliable government booster nonetheless forced to admit on state television that there were no lines at polling booths, Norton was lampooned by the Nicaraguan blog Bacanalnica as a “cartoon … who hangs out with the most nefarious governments on the planet.” The site went on to ask: “Where were you when members of 100% Noticias were imprisoned and their offices closed? Did you ask for justice when they raided and closed Confidencial? Did you complain when La Prensa’s paper was detained at customs?”

Unlike the visiting Americans, the charade was too much for many regional leaders, with Peru’s left-wing government saying the vote “did not meet the minimum criteria of free, fair and transparent elections” and deserved “the rejection of the international community.” Carlos Alvarado Quesada, the left-wing president of neighboring Costa Rica, wrote that “due to their lack of democratic conditions & guarantees, we do not recognize the elections in Nicaragua” and called on the government to free its political prisoners.

Nicaraguans themselves believe they see the true face of the regime for what it is.

“Ortega is more willing to sell out the national patrimony than even Somoza was,” said Bianca Jagger, the Nicaraguan-born human rights and social justice activist. “When we talk about what people think of this idea of a leftist revolution, they better think twice. If anyone betrayed the principles that inspired this revolution, it was Daniel Ortega. The left needs to come to terms that their utopian dreams of what these revolutions have brought to these countries are completely and totally fictitious. These revolutions have betrayed the very ideals they began to fight for.”

All of this finally brings us to Cuba, the site of the hemisphere’s oldest dictatorship and the nation where sanguinary tyranny marketed with a T-shirt and a beret have seduced more people into dictatorial apologia than any other. When protests erupted on the island this past July, many acted as if the event was unexpected. But in fact the pressure had been increasing heavily in recent years, propelled by both an intolerant, lily-white political and military elite and the ever-tightening grip of sanctions imposed by the United States, theoretically to pressure the regime but in reality punishing ordinary citizens.

Ruled by the Castro family and their allies since 1959 and not having seen a democratic election since 1948, Cuba is a case study in optics versus reality. For more than 60 years, the country has been led by Fidel Castro (1959 to 2008), Raúl Castro (2008 to 2019) and Miguel Díaz-Canel (2019 to present) — three white men — as they have presided over a police state that in its early era rounded up and tortured gay men in concentration camps (an experience searingly documented in the book “Antes que anochezca” by Cuban writer Reinaldo Arenas), has aided liberation struggles elsewhere in Latin America and in Africa while denying its own citizens the ability to choose the political or economic system by which they wished to be governed, and has remained passionately hostile to independent expressions of Afro-Cuban and LGBTQ identity. The government sent cadres of doctors abroad but then used them as a source of hard currency, gobbling up most of their salaries and imposing severe curbs on their freedom of expression and freedom of association. To Venezuela, it sent security personnel and torturers. Memorably described by their former close ally Carlos Franqui as a couple of puritanical, intolerant bumpkins from the rural backwater of Birán aghast at the “decadent” Afro-Cuban culture they encountered in cities like Santiago de Cuba and Havana, the Castro brothers set in motion a square, macho military culture on the island that remains very much the ruling aesthetic today.

The latest round of protests can arguably be traced back to 2018, when many young artists and intellectuals began protesting against Decree 349, a draconian edict prohibiting musicians, artists, writers and other performers from operating in public or private without prior approval by Cuba’s Ministry of Culture. This would eventually lead to the formation of the Movimiento San Isidro, a collective named after a poor and historically marginalized Havana neighborhood and encompassing a wide range of artists, writers and musicians. Led by people such as the art historian and gallerist Yanelys Núñez Leyva, the Afro-Cuban poet Amuary Pacacecho and the performance artist Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, the protests would dovetail in May 2019 with what many see as Cuba’s “Stonewall moment.” Hundreds of LGBTQ activists attempted a conga parade through La Habana Vieja, an unauthorized event that was separate from the regime’s “official” LGBTQ events affiliated with the Centro Nacional de Educación Sexual (CENESEX, founded by Raúl Castro’s daughter Mariela Castro). The march was immediately set upon by security forces, its leaders beaten and arrested. This in turn was followed by a November 2020 demonstration in front of Cuba’s Ministry of Culture — viewed by many as a turning point with public expression of dissatisfaction with the regime — when hundreds of protesters (many of them young, Afro-Cuban, queer or otherwise marginalized) called on the regime to free imprisoned rapper Denis Solís.

Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara grew up in Cerro, one of Havana’s poorest neighborhoods with a rich tradition of Afro-Cuban culture. When I spoke to him in late 2020, before the recent upheavals and before he disappeared again into the regime’s gulag (he had previously been arrested more than 30 times), he told me bluntly that “the Cuban regime is weighted on the basis of white men — macho, patriarchal, white men — with white women and wives as well. Cuban television and all the Cuban cultural apparatus still operate on a racist basis.”

Even today, white Cubans are five times more likely than Black Cubans to have a bank account and control 98% of the island’s private businesses.

At the beginning of last year, an anthemic song “Patria y Vida” (“Homeland and Life,” itself a refutation of the Cuban revolutionary slogan “Fatherland or Death”), a collaboration by Yotuel of the rap group Orishas, Descemer Bueno, the group Gente de Zona, Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, Maykel Osorbo and DJ El Funky, was released and seized the popular imagination. Its lyrics (“No more lies! / My people demand freedom! / No more doctrines! / No longer shall we cry ‘Fatherland or death’ / But ‘Fatherland and life!’”) seemed to articulate the boiling struggle and frustration of ordinary Cubans (the song went on to win the Latin Grammy for song of the year last month).

On July 11 of last year, protests over shortages of basic goods, economic hardship and the government’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic began in the western city of San Antonio de los Baños. The protests soon spread all over the country in an unprecedented display of frustration and civil disobedience. From Havana in the west to Santiago de Cuba in the east, thousands of Cuban citizens took to the streets chanting both “patria y vida” and “change the system.” Initially taken by surprise, Cuban security forces responded with brutality and mass arrests of protesters, with Díaz-Canel appearing on state television to say, “the order to combat has been given.” Hundreds of people (including at least 44 minors) were arrested (14 of the latter remain in prison). The government cut off internet access around the island, but it was too late. The images of protests and the merciless response of state security forces quickly were seen around the world, as were messages like that of Afro-Cuban rapper Roberto Álvarez, who said, “The streets of Cuba belong to the Cubans. Not to the Communist Party. Not to the Cuban military. Not to the Castro family. To the Cubans.”

The protests laid bare the often thinly disguised racism in the paternalistic discourse of the island’s Communist elite, at this point little more than a wretched, bloated ruling caste guarding their hotels (the Cuban regime spends 57 times more on tourism than they do on healthcare). At the height of last July’s protests, Aleida Guevara March, the daughter of Che Guevara (whose own caustic racism led him to label people of African descent as “lack[ing] an affinity with bathing” as well as being “indolent … spending [their] meager wage on frivolity or drink”) huffed that the protesters “showed a very low level of culture.” When “Patria y Vida” won a Grammy in November, José Carlos Rodríguez Ruiz, Cuba’s aging (and white) ambassador to Italy, tweeted a link to an article clutching its pearls that the young upstarts had “sneaked into the same space” as other artists of superior “caliber.”

In a report published this past October, Human Rights Watch found that the Cuban government “systematically engaged in arbitrary detention, ill treatment of detainees, and abuse-ridden criminal prosecutions in response to overwhelmingly peaceful antigovernment protests” in July. Both Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara and Maykel Osorbo are among those in prison and learned of “Patria y Vida” winning a Grammy from behind bars. In November, UNICEF expressed its concern over the ongoing detention of minors in connection with the July events.

“The Cuban government sells itself as a leftist, progressive government, but the reality is just the contrary,” Abraham Jiménez Enoa, an Afro-Cuban journalist, told me this month. “Historically, those who occupy the highest positions here are almost always white. … It’s the same with the treatment of the opposition. Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara is in jail, Maykel Osorbo is in jail, but meanwhile with [white oppositionists] the government negotiates exile. … [They] can get on a plane. It’s structural racism and it’s clear how it functions in Cuba.”

The Havana regime — after more than six decades of uninterrupted, total power — still has its apologists. University of Glasgow professor Helen Yaffe tut-tutted in the pages of The Guardian about the “violent” protests (though the protesters damaged some property, nearly all the physical violence came at the hands of the regime). She argued that “US funding and coordination” were behind the protests, as if Cubans were too ignorant and lazy to become fed up on their own with being pauperized and beaten. Yaffe frequently promotes pro-regime content from outlets with links to the Russian government such as Redfish and others like MintPress News, which in 2013 published an article falsely claiming anti-Assad rebels had staged a chemical weapons attack in the Damascus suburb of Ghouta (which one of the authors then denied writing).

The official Black Lives Matter organization (distinct from the ethos and movement of the same name), which had previously praised Fidel Castro and whose co-founder Patrisse Khan-Cullors owns palatial homes in Los Angeles and Atlanta, issued a press release praising the regime, condemning the embargo but eschewing any mention of the brave Black and brown Cubans being brutalized and terrorized by the regime. In an absurd open letter last November ahead of more planned protests that the regime averted by turning virtually the entire island into an armed camp, a litany of signatories that included both the criminal (former Ecuador President Rafael Correa, in exile and convicted of corruption at home) and the useless (Castro family chronicler and former Le Monde Diplomatique editor Ignacio Ramonet) attacked the dissidents as “irrelevant within Cuba but praised by the international press with the purpose of damaging the image of the revolution.” The letter accused them of “civil disobedience, anarchy and chaos, with the sole purpose of ending the current political system.” The words were richly ironic, especially coming from signatories like former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, herself once a member of the Vanguarda Armada Revolucionária guerrilla group in Brazil.

But in many ways the July protests marked a serious break with the regime’s formerly good press among the left. René Pérez, better known as Residente, a member of the Puerto Rican musical group Calle 13 and with impeccable anti-imperialist credentials, posted an Instagram message of support for the demonstrators “so that they manifest themselves with all force. … Demonstrating is a human right anywhere in the world.” He added his belief that “this demonstration was born from a tired people … who woke up.” The Puerto Rican singer Ricky Martin, reggaeton artist Daddy Yankee, Mexican singer Julieta Venegas and Spanish singer Alejandro Sanz also all expressed their support for the protesters. In December, more than 300 prominent figures — including Isabel Allende, Paul Auster, John Lithgow and Orhan Pamuk — released an open letter calling on Cuba’s government to immediately stop its abuses against Cuban artists, intellectuals and others.

There are real-world implications for this ideological rigidity.

Last November, U.S. President Joe Biden signed the Reinforcing Nicaragua’s Adherence to Conditions for Electoral Reform (RENACER) Act. It calls for new initiatives to monitor and address corruption by Nicaragua’s government and abuses by its security force as well as expansion of sanctions against key officials. It also orders a formal review to determine whether Nicaragua should be allowed continued participation in the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). When the bill came up for a vote in the House of Representatives earlier that month, however, many members of the body’s left (including New York Reps. Bowman and Ocasio-Cortez, Missouri Rep. Bush, Michigan Reps. Andy Levin and Tlaib and Minnesota Rep. Ilhan Omar) joined members of the extreme right such as Florida Rep.Matt Gaetz, Georgia Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene and Kentucky Rep. Thomas Massie in trying to defeat it.

A more party-line vote followed for House Resolution 760, a measure “expressing solidarity with Cuban citizens demonstrating peacefully for fundamental freedoms, condemning the Cuban regime’s acts of repression, and calling for the immediate release of arbitrarily detained Cuban citizens.” It also called for the U.S. government to “assess whether the United States can develop methods to allow remittances, medical supplies, and other forms of support from the United States to directly benefit the Cuban people in ways that alleviate humanitarian suffering without providing United States dollars to the Cuban military.” While no Republicans opposed the measure, 40 Democrats voted no, among them all of the aforementioned Democrats as well as California Rep. Maxine Waters, New York Rep. Nydia M. Velázquez and Arizona Rep. Raúl Grijalva. When I contacted some of the above members to explain their vote, the offices of only two responded: Bush, who declined comment, and Grijalva, who in a statement said, in part, “Both bills contained serious economic and humanitarian policy concerns that were not taken into account when these pieces of legislation were rushed to the House floor. The legislation perpetuates a counterproductive foreign policy that would harm millions of innocent civilians instead of the regimes in power.” How either bill, neither of which proposed broad general economic sanctions, would have done this is unclear.

So what is the way forward for those in the principled left who want to stand in solidarity with disenfranchised people instead of regimes composed of their torturers and oppressors?

There is a sector of the Western left eternally enamored of flags, slogans and ceaseless homages to dead leaders that is every bit as illiberal as the caustic right and whose support seems to have less to do with any kind of coherent humanitarian policy outlook and more to do with facile anti-Americanism and an impulse for dictator worship, as if defending the abusive practices of security forces in Venezuela is better than defending them in Colombia, or defending the extractive policies of a left-wing government in Bolivia is somehow more appropriate than defending the same policies when done by the right-wing government of Brazil.

There needs to be an international realignment among left forces and more willingness to listen to movements on the ground rather than only governments. In the recent victory of left wing Gabriel Boric in Chile’s presidential elections — a man whose solidly progressive bonafides did not keep him from calling Nicaragua’s recent elections a “farce” and declaring “solidarity with the people rising up in Cuba and not the Díaz-Canel government” — we may be seeing the beginnings of a regional third way.

Throughout Latin America, there are heroic progressive forces laying down their lives in the service of the most vulnerable every day, fighting to defend the environment, people of African and indigenous descent, the marginalized and the LGBTQ community. It is to them those of us among the international left should extend our loyalty and support, not their jailers and executioners.